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Abstract
Introduction: The purpose of this study was to describe a nosocomial outbreak caused by methicillin resistant
Staphylococcus pseudintermedius (MRSP) ST71 SCCmec II-III in dogs and cats at the Veterinary Teaching Hospital of the
University of Helsinki in November 2010 – January 2012, and to determine the risk factors for acquiring MRSP. In addition,
measures to control the outbreak and current policy for MRSP prevention are presented.
Methods: Data of patients were collected from the hospital patient record software. MRSP surveillance data were acquired
from the laboratory information system. Risk factors for MRSP acquisition were analyzed from 55 cases and 213 controls
using multivariable logistic regression in a case-control study design. Forty-seven MRSP isolates were analyzed by pulsed
field gel electrophoresis and three were further analyzed with multi-locus sequence and SCCmec typing.
Results: Sixty-three MRSP cases were identified, including 27 infections. MRSPs from the cases shared a specific multi-drug
resistant antibiogram and PFGE-pattern indicated clonal spread. Four risk factors were identified; skin lesion (OR= 6.2; CI95%
2.3–17.0, P= 0.0003), antimicrobial treatment (OR= 3.8, CI95% 1.0–13.9, P= 0.0442), cumulative number of days in the
intensive care unit (OR= 1.3, CI95% 1.1–1.6, P= 0.0007) or in the surgery ward (OR= 1.1, CI95% 1.0–1.3, P= 0.0401). Tracing and
screening of contact patients, enhanced hand hygiene, cohorting and barrier nursing, as well as cleaning and disinfection
were used to control the outbreak. To avoid future outbreaks and spread of MRSP a search-and-isolate policy was
implemented. Currently nearly all new MRSP findings are detected in screening targeted to risk patients on admission.
Conclusion: Multidrug resistant MRSP is capable of causing a large outbreak difficult to control. Skin lesions, antimicrobial
treatment and prolonged hospital stay increase the probability of acquiring MRSP. Rigorous control measures were needed
to control the outbreak. We recommend the implementation of a search-and-isolate policy to reduce the burden of MRSP.
Citation: Gro¨nthal T, Moodley A, Nyka¨senoja S, Junnila J, Guardabassi L, et al. (2014) Large Outbreak Caused by Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus
pseudintermedius ST71 in a Finnish Veterinary Teaching Hospital – From Outbreak Control to Outbreak Prevention. PLoS ONE 9(10): e110084. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0110084
Editor: Paul J. Planet, Columbia University, United States of America
Received May 14, 2014; Accepted September 12, 2014; Published October 15, 2014
Copyright:  2014 Gro¨nthal et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: The authors confirm that all data underlying the findings are fully available without restriction. All relevant data are within the paper and its
Supporting Information files. Supporting files contain a raw data spreadsheet for risk factor study and MLST-sequences of two strains.
Funding: TG was funded by Finnish Foundation of Veterinary Research; http://www.sels.fi/index_eng.htm, grant number 3-291-29. 4Pharma Ltd., provided
support in the form of a salary for author JJ. The funders had no role in the study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Competing Interests: JJ is an employee of 4Pharma Ltd. There are no patents, products in development or marketed products to declare. This does not alter
the authors’ adherence to all the PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.
* Email: thomas.gronthal@helsinki.fi
Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus pseudintermedius (MRSP)
has emerged as a major animal pathogen in veterinary medicine
[1], similar to methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
in human medicine [2]. MRSP can cause a wide variety of
infections that are difficult to treat due to multi-drug resistance [1].
Transmission is mainly due to global spread of epidemic clones
such as ST71, the predominant clone in Europe, and ST68, the
predominant clone in North America [3]. Among others,
hospitalization and antimicrobial treatment have been recognized
as risk factors for MRSP colonization or infection [4–7].
Indistinguishable or closely related MRSP isolates from patients,
environmental sites and staff members at veterinary clinics have
been reported [8,9] suggestive of veterinary care associated spread
of MRSP. However, to our best knowledge, no nosocomial
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outbreak reports of MRSP have yet been published. In addition,
little information exists about infection control and preventive
measures in practical situations.
The Veterinary Teaching Hospital of the University of Helsinki
experienced a nosocomial MRSP outbreak between November
2010 and January 2012 with 63 confirmed cases among canine
and feline patients. Prior to this MRSP was a very rare finding
among patients of the Veterinary Teaching Hospital (Figure 1).
The goal of this study was to (i) identify and characterize the strain
causing the outbreak, (ii) to describe the outbreak and determine
risk factors for acquiring MRSP, (iii) to describe the control
measures implemented to contain the outbreak and (iv) to present
our current policy for prevention of further outbreaks and the
spread of MRSP. The hypothesis was that in addition to previously
recognized risk factors, many variables related to patient
condition, duration of surgical procedures, as well as the length
of antimicrobial therapy increases the risk for MRSP acquisition
during an outbreak.
Materials and methods
The hospital setting
The Veterinary Teaching Hospital of the University of Helsinki
is a national primary care and referral animal hospital in Finland.
The hospital provides 24/7 emergency and intensive care services
for animals primarily in the Greater Helsinki area. The Small
Animal Hospital of the unit has approximately 18 000 visits
annually, with nearly 2000 surgical procedures. Approximately
80% of patients are dogs, 17% cats and the rest are other species.
Bacteriological specimens from the hospital are investigated by the
Clinical Microbiology Laboratory of the Faculty of Veterinary
Medicine. The laboratory receives specimens from all over
Finland. Apart from investigation of clinical specimens the
laboratory is responsible for resistance surveillance of small animal
pathogens in the hospital and in Finland.
Epidemiological investigation and definitions
The study population consisted of dogs and cats that had been
hospitalized for 1 day or more at the Small Animal Hospital
during the outbreak period (November 2010 – January 2012) and
thus were potentially exposed to nosocomial MRSP. Cases were
either colonized (MRSP cultured only from mucous membranes)
or infected (MRSP cultured from an infection site) with MRSP
displaying the following antibiogram; resistance to oxacillin (and
thus all beta-lactams), erythromycin, clindamycin, sulfamethoxa-
zole-trimethoprim, gentamicin, tetracycline and enrofloxacin and
susceptibility to fusidic acid and amikacin. To exclude community
acquired MRSPs, only infections detected in the outbreak period
either after surgical procedures performed at the hospital or other
infections which appeared after prolonged or several treatment
periods in the hospital were included. Colonized patients were
enrolled if the MRSP was detected after at least 1 day of
hospitalization and the animal had been treated in the same wards
as MRSP positive patients. Controls were patients from the same
population as cases but were negative in MRSP screening. Patients
with a positive MRSP specimen on first admission, and non-
hospitalized (polyclinic) patients were excluded from the study.
The investigation extended over a total of 26 months
comprising the outbreak period (November 2010 – January
2012) and the follow-up period (February 2012 – November
2012). Treatment histories of the patients were gathered from the
hospital patient registry software (Provet YES 1.1, Finnish Net
Solutions Oy, Finland). Variables, including their definitions, are
presented in Table 1. Data were collected for each individual from
one month prior to the index case (i.e. from October 2010) up
until the first positive MRSP finding (cases) or the latest date the
patient was screened negative for MRSP (controls). Dates refer to
Figure 1. The monthly cumulative incidence of all MRSPs and MRSPs displaying the outbreak antibiogram (MRSP ST71) among
patients of the Small Animal Hospital of Helsinki University from January 2010 to December 2012. In late 2011 a small cluster of ST45
among hospitalized patients contributed to an increase in incidence. From January 2012 onwards the great majority of new MRSP findings have been
detected in screening targeted to risk patients on admission. In December 2012 the increase was not due to a cluster, but was due to the detection of
different types of MRSPs mainly in patients belonging to risk groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.g001
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when the specimen was taken. In addition, data on the cumulative
incidence of MRSP before, during and after the outbreak was
collected and presented as total incidence (all new MRSP findings)
and as incidence of the outbreak MRSP. This data were extracted
from the laboratory information system (connected to the patient
registry software). Since one patient with the defined MRSP had
been observed in July 2010, a trace-back analysis was performed to
evaluate any relationship of that patient to the current outbreak.
This study did not require separate ethical approval since
outbreaks are routinely investigated according to the hospital
ethical guidelines to ensure patient safety. The owners of the
animals were informed about the outbreak and study. They agreed
to the investigation as well as any attempts to control the outbreak.
Owners also gave permission to take the necessary specimens. The
hospital covered the costs of screening specimens of exposed
patients and specimens to monitor the efficacy of the control
measures. Data was handled anonymously.
Data analysis and statistical methods
Descriptive analysis of cases was done by presenting the number
of new cases per week over the outbreak and follow-up periods in
the epidemic curve along with the implemented control measures.
The number of colonized and infected patients was recorded. The
attack rate was determined by using the number of hospitalized
patients as the denominator. The risk factors (Table 1) for
acquiring MRSP were assessed with logistic regression. For the
risk factor study data were available for 55 cases and 213 controls.
Each factor was first modeled using a univariable logistic
regression models. To control for confounders, a stepwise
multivariable logistic regression analysis was conducted for the
risk factors with a P value #0.05 in the univariate analyses. In the
stepwise selection process, a significance level of 0.15 was required
to allow a variable into the multivariable model, and a significance
level of 0.20 was required for a variable to stay in the multivariable
model. Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) were
calculated. P values (Wald) #0.05 were considered statistically
significant. All statistical analyses were done using SAS System for
Windows, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., USA).
Microbiological investigation
Specimens for bacterial cultures were taken from infection sites
of all patients as soon as signs of infection were noticed. To screen
for MRSP colonization (screening specimens), specimens were
taken from the mucous membranes of patients with or without
infection. For this, three sites were swabbed in patient; the nares
and oral mucous membranes with one swab, and the perineum
with another. If the patient had a wound or skin sore, that was also
swabbed. Screening specimens were taken frequently from contact
patients and regularly from all hospitalized patients (Figure 2) in
order to monitor the extension of the outbreak and efficacy of
control measures. Patients were screened repeatedly if they had
long term hospitalization or several treatment periods. In the
autumn 2011 there was a two month period of enhanced
surveillance when every hospitalized patient (n = 72) was screened
both on admission and on discharge. In addition, environmental
swabs (n = 65) were taken to evaluate efficacy of daily cleaning and
disinfection routines and the role of the environment as the source
of MRSP on three occasions.
Specimens from superficial infection sites and urine were
cultured aerobically, whereas specimens from deep lesions,
aspirates and blood were also cultured anaerobically. Both non-
selective and selective plates were used for primary cultures
according to the laboratory protocol. The protocol also included
direct plating onto MRSA selective agar (MRSA Select, Bio Rad
Laboratories, France) and enrichment culture for MRSP (see
below). Screening specimens from the patient were cultured by
pooling the swabs into an enrichment broth (Brain Heart Infusion
broth with 6.5% NaCl, Tammer-Tutkan Maljat Oy, Finland) and
incubated for 16–22 h at +35.0uC (60.2uC). The enrichment
broth was then plated onto MRSA-selective agar and incubated
up to 48 h at +35.0uC (60.2uC), and were interpreted once a day.
The limit of detection for enrichment culture method had been
determined to be $10 CFU for MRSP with oxacillin minimum
inhibitory concentration (MIC) of $4 mg/ml in internal valida-
tion. Suspected MRSP colonies (pale pink to pink colonies) were
subcultured onto tryptic soy agar with 5% sheep blood (Oxoid
Ltd., UK). Presumptive identification of S. pseudintermedius was
based on typical colony morphology, positive tube coagulation test
(BBL Coagulase Plasma, Becton Dickinson, USA) and suscepti-
bility to polymyxin B (300 U, Oxoid Ltd, UK) (sensitive $10 mm,
resistant ,10 mm). If identification was doubtful, sugar fermen-
tation tests (Diatabs, Rosco Diagnostica A/S, Denmark) or API
Staph ID 32 (bioMe´rieux SA, France) were used. Antimicrobial
susceptibility testing was done in accordance with Clinical and
Laboratory Standards Institute guidelines [10] by using the disk-
diffusion method (Oxoid Ltd., UK). Breakpoints for oxacillin
Table 1. Variables analyzed from cases and controls during the MRSP outbreak in the Small Animal Hospital of Helsinki University
between 2010 and 2011.
Species (dog/cat) Emergency surgery (during weekend/evening/night) Aminopenicillin medication given
Age (years) Length of anesthesia (min) bDays of aminopenicillin therapy
Gender bDays in hospital Cephalosporin medication given
Breed bDays in surgery ward bDays of cephalosporin therapy
Weight (kg) bDays in intensive care unit cEnrofloxacin medication given
aSeverity of condition bDays in other wards bDays of enrofloxacin therapy
Skin lesions of any cause Antimicrobial medication given Proton pump inhibitor (PPI) given
Surgical procedure bDays of any antimicrobial therapy bDays of PPI therapy
aSeverity was judged by the author (TG) on a scale of 1 to 5 after reviewing the patient record on admission and was based on the guidelines provided by the American
Society of Anesthesiologists.
bThe same patient might have had several visits or courses of medication, therefore the cumulative number of days for these variables was recorded until the first
positive MRSP specimen (cases), or latest negative MRSP specimen (controls), see text for details.
cEnrofloxacin was the only fluoroquinolone used for these patients.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.t001
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susceptibility presented by Bemis et al. [11] were used. Oxacillin
MIC was determined by E-test (Oxoid Ltd., UK). MRSP isolates
were sent to the Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) for
verification of the presence of mecA [12].
Isolate characterization
Forty-seven isolates were available for pulsed field gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE) typing. A modified version of the HARMONY
protocol as described by Murchan et al. [13] was used.
Approximately 46108 colony forming units per strain were
suspended into 200 ml of EC-buffer (1 M sodium chloride, 0,5%
Polyoxyethylene 20 cetyl ether, 0,2% w/v sodium deoxycholate,
0,5% w/v N-lauroyl-sarcosine sodium salt, 0,1 M EDTA, 6 mM
1,0 M Tris-HCl). The plugs were made by mixing the bacteria
and EC-buffer suspension with 20 ml of lysostaphin (1 mg/ml,
Sigma-Aldrich, USA), and 200 ml of 2% SeaPlaque GTG agarose
(Lonza Inc., USA). The digestion was done using a 10% NEBuffer
4 and 20 U SmaI (New England BioLabs Inc., USA) for 4–
18 hours. The pulse field electrophoresis was done in 1% SeaKem
agar (Lonza Inc., USA) on the CHEF-DR III system (Bio-Rad
Laboratories, USA). Gels were stained with SYBR Safe DNA gel
stain (Life technologies, USA) and analyzed using GelCompar II v.
6.5 software (Applied Maths NV, Belgium), and cluster analysis
was performed by UPGMA based on the Dice similarity
coefficient, with optimization and position tolerance both set at
1%. Isolates were clustered using an 85% similarity cut-off. The
strains were considered to be closely related (#3 band differences)
or subtypes of the same clone (4–6 band differences) according to
Tenover et al. [14]. Based on PFGE, three strains representing
subtypes of the clone (Figure 3) were further characterized by
SCCmec [15] and multilocus sequence typing (MLST) [16], and
confirmed to be S. pseudintermedius by species specific nuc PCR
[17]. MLST type was determined by comparing sequences of the
housekeeping genes to the S. pseudintermedius MLST database
(http://pubmlst.org/spseudintermedius/).
Results
Description of the outbreak
During the outbreak period 63 cases were identified; 27 (43%)
of these were infections, while 36 (57%) were colonized patients.
Of the infected patients, three developed MRSP infection several
weeks after colonization was detected. The types of the MRSP-
infections are summarized in Table 2. The attack rate of MRSP
among hospitalized patients was 2.1% (63/2969) and among
patients discharged from the ICU 3.8% (43/1121). MRSP was the
cause of a surgical wound infection in 0.9% of surgical procedures
(17/1864). Fifty-eight of the cases (92%) were dogs and five (8%)
were cats; dogs represented more than 40 different breeds, all five
cats were domestic short haired. The epidemic curve indicating
the number of new cases per week is presented in Figure 2; and
the cumulative incidences both for the outbreak MRSP and all
new MRSP findings before, during and after the outbreak in
Figure 1.
The index patient was a 3 year-old dachshund that was referred
to the Small Animal Hospital emergency care unit at the end of
October 2010. The dog had systemic inflammatory response
syndrome with disseminated intravascular coagulation due to
necrotizing mastitis and a postoperative complication after
cesarean section and ovariohysterectomy performed at two
different private practices. The dog required surgery again at the
Small Animal Hospital to remove necrotized tissue and was
treated in the intensive care unit (ICU) for 1 week. The tissue
specimen yielded pure growth of Escherichia coli. However, two
days after discharge, in the beginning of November 2010, a
surgical site infection was noted. The bacteriological culture
revealed MRSP with the aforementioned multi-drug resistance
antibiogram. The finding was extraordinary and therefore an
outbreak investigation was initiated. This involved active case
finding by culturing all infection sites and screening of patients
potentially exposed to MRSP.
Trace-back analysis to the case in June 2010 did not reveal any
apparent relationship to the outbreak. Subsequently the index
case, active case finding revealed many new cases (Figure 2). After
control measures in late 2010, and early 2011 the incidence of
MRSP decreased for a while. The situation worsened again in the
Figure 2. An epidemic curve showing new MRSP ST71 cases during the outbreak in 2010–2012 at the Small Animal Hospital of
Helsinki University. The outbreak period was between November 2010 and January 2012, after which the follow-up period was started. A: hospital
closed for 2 days for cleaning and disinfection, B: establishment of cohort ward, C: nurse responsible for hospital hygiene appointed, D: hospital
closed for 5 days for cleaning and disinfection, E: veterinarian appointed as infection control officer. S: Screening of hospitalized patients, H:
environmental swabs taken.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.g002
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Figure 3. Dendrogram of 47 MRSP isolates with the outbreak antibiogram (see text). Staphylococcus pseudintermedius ATCC 49444 is
displayed as a control. *Further characterized by multilocus sequence typing and SCCmec-typing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.g003
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summer and fall of 2011, leading to extensive control measures
after which control was achieved. However, the investigation was
interfered by a small cluster of MRSP ST45 detected in late
2011(Figure 1, File S2). The outbreak was considered to be over in
January of 2012, when no new MRSP findings were revealed in
three consecutive MRSP screenings of all hospitalized patients.
After this the follow-up period was started. During the follow up
period nine new MRSP findings with the outbreak antibiogram
were detected. Of these, seven were explained by previous
exposure due to hospitalization during the outbreak. Thus the
total toll of cases connected to the outbreak was 70. The other two
were not spatially or temporally connected to the outbreak. In the
follow-up period all MRSP cases with the outbreak antibiogram
were identified on admission using the risk patient classification
criteria (Table 3). Regardless of this, all hospitalized patients were
screened for MRSP on seven occasions, but no new cases were
detected among these (Figure 2).
Risk factor analysis
Several risk factors were significant by univariable analyses
(Table 4, Table S1). However, after controlling for confounders,
the logistic regression model revealed only four significant risk
factors; skin lesions of any origin (including surgical incisions) (OR
6.24, CI95% 2.30–16.97), antimicrobial therapy regardless of
duration (OR 3.80, CI95% 1.04–13.92), cumulative number of
days spent in the ICU (OR 1.33, CI95% 1.13–1.57) or in the
surgery ward (OR 1.13, CI95% 1.01–1.27). The results of the
univariable and multivariable analyses are presented in detail in
Table 4.
Table 2. Nosocomial infections (n = 27) caused by the MRSP outbreak strain (ST71, SCCmec II–III) in the Small Animal Hospital of
Helsinki University between 2010 and 2011.
Infection type Number of infections
Surgical site infections (total) 19
Required surgical revision 3
Involved orthopedic devices1 7
Others (uncomplicated) 9
Other wound infections 3
Otitis2 1
Bite wound3 2
Dermatitis4 1
Cystitis complicated by uroliths5 1
1Some cases required removal of surgical devices and revision.
2Patient had orthopedic surgery and several visits to the hospital, otitis was subsequently diagnosed.
3Both patients presented with severe bite wounds; after prolonged hospital stay MRSP was cultured from the wound.
4Patient presented with pneumonia, autoimmune myositis and dermal vasculitis; later developed MRSP infection on the skin lesion.
5Colonization with MRSP preceded the cystitis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.t002
Table 3. The current risk based classification of patients at the Small Animal Hospital of Helsinki University and resulting measures.
Classification Criteria (any of the following) Example of measures
High risk patients MRSP-positive Treated in cohort ward
Has been hospitalized .24 hours and has signs of a hospital acquired Barrier nursing
infection Surgery at the end of the day
Disinfection of facilities
Infection sites cultured
Standard precautions*
Medium risk patients Has a history of recurrent ear or skin infection Screened for MRSP
Has a history of prolonged or numerous hospital visits or visits at Treated in separate rooms
other veterinary clinics reserved for medium risk
Has a history of prolonged or numerous antimicrobial treatments patients
Has been exposed to a patient with MRSP Surgery at the end of the day
Has had surgery elsewhere and has a surgical site infection Standard precautions
Has a suppurative wound infection Infection sites cultured
Low risk patients All other patients All other rooms
Standard precautions
*Includes hand disinfection, hygienic work routine, and use of protective clothing in case of dirty procedures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110084.t003
MRSP Outbreak in a Veterinary Hospital - From Control to Prevention
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Characterization of the outbreak strain
PFGE analysis supported that the outbreak was due to clonal
spread of MRSP. Isolates clustered to one dominant pulsotype, A1
(n= 31), and four subtypes; A2 (n = 8), A3 (n= 6), A4 (n= 1) with a
one band difference and A5 (n = 1) with a four band difference
(Figure 3). On the basis of the typing results of the three isolates,
the strain responsible for the outbreak belonged to ST71 (File S1)
and harbored SCCmec II–III.
Outbreak control measures
The staff and students were informed by e-mail about the
situation on numerous occasions and training sessions were
organized. The use of alcohol-based hand rubs before and after
every patient contact was emphasised, and the use of protective
gear (gloves and gowns) was required during dirty procedures (i.e.
treatment of wounds, performing ear flushing, dental procedures
or administering enemas), or when handling MRSP patients. The
compliance to follow hygienic work order (i.e. performing clean
procedures prior to dirty ones and examining healthy patients
before diseased) was enhanced and immediate disinfection of
secretions with 1% Virkon S (Antec International, UK) was
demanded. The efficacy of the control measures were surveyed by
frequent screening of hospitalized patients (Figure 2). Sixty-five
environmental swabs from high-touch surfaces were collected.
MRSP with the outbreak antibiogram was detected in only one
environmental specimen, and originated from the cohort ward
where MRSP patients were treated since February 2011. This
ward was established to house MRSP-positive and high-risk
patients (Table 3). Extensive cleaning and disinfection of all
hospital surfaces were undertaken a few weeks after the first case
(Figure 2). The ICU was closed during this time. Surface
disinfection with a 1% Virkon S solution was increased.
In November 2011, a nurse responsible for hospital hygiene was
appointed allowing a more effective tracking of discharged patients
exposed to MRSP. These patients received a ‘‘MRSP exposed’’
tag in the electronic patient record. The tag was a sign for staff to
screen the patient for MRSP and classify it as a medium-risk
patient upon returning to the hospital (Table 3). Prior to the end of
2011 the hospital, excluding the emergency policlinic, was closed
for five days for large scale cleaning and disinfection. All staff
participated in the cleaning. From the beginning of 2012 a
veterinarian was appointed as infection control officer to enforce
prudent use of antimicrobials and consult in hospital hygiene and
patients involving infections. After these measures control of the
outbreak was finally achieved (Figure 2).
A ‘‘search-and-isolate’’ policy was launched in early 2012 to
prevent further outbreaks and the spread of MRSP within the
hospital and to the community. In addition to standard
precautions (hand disinfection, hygienic work routine, and use of
protective clothing in case of dirty procedures) this includes (1) the
risk based classification of all patients (Table 3), (2) screening of
patients at risk (at the expense of the owner), (3) isolation of high
risk and MRSP positive patients, (4) screening of contact patients
of new cases either in the hospital or upon revisit (at the expense of
the hospital), (5) early initiation of the outbreak investigation, (6)
surveillance and bacteriological sampling of treatment associated
infections and (7) prudent use of antimicrobials.
Discussion
The MRSP outbreak spanned over a period of 14 months,
during which 63 patients were found to be infected (n= 27) or
colonized (n= 36). Additionally, seven more temporally and
spatially connected cases were detected during the follow up
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period. There are several factors which suggest that this was a
nosocomial outbreak: (i) the cases were spatially and temporally
connected, (ii) the patients had no evidence of MRSP on admission
and (iii) molecular characterization supported clonal spread. Also,
all infections were related to hospital care as they were surgical site
infections or other infections which appeared after prolonged
hospital treatment. It was likewise considered very unlikely, that
MRSPs of colonized patients were community acquired since this
MRSP type was very rare prior to the outbreak and no similar
type of MRSP was observed among outpatients or specimens
submitted from private clinics during the outbreak. In addition,
many of our cases (n = 30) had given a negative MRSP result in
former bacteriological specimens taken on or soon after the first
admission.
This is the first report of MRSP in Finland. The outbreak strain
was the multi-drug resistant global MRSP clone ST71-SCCmec
II–III [3]. This clone has also been found in other Nordic
countries such as Denmark [3], Sweden [18] and Norway [19].
For our patients the strain caused a number of nosocomial
infections ranging from dermatitis to osteomyelitis, with the
majority being surgical site infections after non-elective proce-
dures. In one case the colonization was followed by a urinary tract
infection, complicated by urolith formation leading to surgery. In
another case an MRSP infection was the most likely cause for
euthanasia, but this could not be confirmed since no autopsy was
done.
Many patients required prolonged hospital treatment or surgical
procedure to combat the infection. Majority of infections were
treated without systemic antimicrobials, but if considered neces-
sary, amikacin was used. The exception was a case with urinary
tract infection which was treated with nitrofurantoin. The fact that
MRSP infections were manageable without systemic antimicrobi-
als is encouraging. This approach could even be considered in
infections caused by susceptible bacteria, provided that no
systemic signs are present.
The risk factors for MRSP according to the multivariable
analysis were skin lesions of any origin, antimicrobial therapy –
regardless of duration, and cumulative number of days treated in
the ICU or in the surgery unit. The length of antimicrobial
therapy was not a significant risk factor in the final model. This
indicates that any antimicrobial treatment may increase the risk
for the acquisition of MRSP in an outbreak, possibly due to the
high infection pressure. The result may not be generalized to the
outpatient population, in which the cumulative use of antimicro-
bials could be the more important factor. Multiple factors
operating in an intricate fashion lead to the elimination of many
of the studied variables in the final model, suggesting the presence
of confounders, such as surgery and skin lesions, and surgery and
the use of antimicrobials.
In hospital outbreaks caused by multidrug resistant bacteria, it is
often expected to have more colonized than infected patients, as
were also the case in this outbreak. While infection is more
harmful to the individual patient and more expensive to the
hospital, failure to recognize colonized patients would likely have
led to an underestimation of the extent of the outbreak, or even the
unrecognition of the outbreak. Colonized and infected patients
were pooled as cases for the risk factor analysis. If handled
separately in the risk factor analysis one would not possibly reach
the power to identify a common source or relevant factors
associated with emergence of the pathogen. We think it is
reasonable to assume that there is no biological difference in the
acquisition of MRSP in colonized and infected patients. Coloni-
zation can precede the infection, as was the case also in our study
in three of the patients, or colonization and infection may develop
simultaneously depending on where the pathogen enters the body
as well as on the characteristics of the individual’s immune status.
In many cases infection never occurs. Also, exact differentiation
between colonization and infection especially in mild cases can be
difficult, since signs of inflammation can be very similar to
infection.
Studies evaluating risk factors for MRSP have previously been
done by comparing patients diagnosed with MRSP infection with
patients with methicillin susceptible S. pseudintermedius (MSSP)
infection [6,7], or comparing MRSP positive patients with MRSP
negatives on admission to a hospital [5]. Antimicrobial treatment
[5,6] as well as treatment duration [4] has been associated with an
increased risk for MRSP. Interestingly, Lehner et al. [7] did not
observe antimicrobial treatment as a risk factor for MRSP
infection, but linked glucocorticoid therapy to an increased risk
for MRSP infection. However, glucocorticoid therapy may also be
associated with other factors, such as atopy or allergy [5]. Risk
factors regarding MRSP in cats are poorly documented, but there
is evidence that colonization rates of S. pseudintermedius [20] and
MRSP are lower in cats compared to dogs [21]. Conversely,
Lehner et al. [7] concluded that cats were at an increased risk of
MRSP infection compared to dogs, although the result may have
been due to bias caused by the sampling strategy. In our study the
species was not a risk factor for MRSP. Cats were not separately
analyzed in our study due to their low number. Still, species
specific risk factors warrant further study.
Previous hospitalization has been shown to be a risk factor for
MRSP [5,7], suggesting that MRSP is an important hospital
associated pathogen. The epidemiology of MRSP appears to be
comparable to that of MRSA in humans or animals, as also
MRSA originally emerged in hospitals [1,22]. Other groups at risk
for MRSP are patients with chronic dermatological disorders [4],
most likely due to long-term antimicrobial pressure, frequent
veterinary visits [7] and properties of the diseased skin [23], all of
which favor the acquisition of MRSP. In light of these facts MRSP
can currently be considered more a hospital associated than a
community associated pathogen. In animals it may be challenging
to differentiate between hospital and community acquired
infections. Firstly, there is a lack of common definitions for these
in veterinary medicine. Additionally, the majority of hospital
acquired infections (such as surgical site infections) appear at home
because the duration of hospitalization is usually short and many
elective procedures are performed as outpatient surgery (day
surgery). Therefore it is uncertain whether infections related to
treatment are correctly classified as hospital acquired or veterinary
care associated infections. If the spread is not controlled in the
veterinary premises, it is inevitable that MRSP will become more
prevalent in the community. This increases the likelihood of
community acquired MRSP even in animals with no apparent risk
factors. Similar development has already been observed in MRSA
in humans [2,24].
There are limitations in this study. The quality of the data is
dependent on how well information has been recorded in the
patient management software, but this type of bias is expected to
be equally distributed among cases and controls. In this study the
data were not systematically available on underlying disorders
such as allergies or metabolic diseases. In addition, information on
variables related to patient care, such as the number of times the
animal was handled or the exact placing of the patient (e.g. cage
number), was not available. This sort of information could be
helpful in order to understand the dynamics of the outbreak. Some
degree of misclassification may have occurred due to the imperfect
sensitivity of the MRSP screening method. Studies have reported
the sensitivity of similar methods for MRSA in humans or livestock
MRSP Outbreak in a Veterinary Hospital - From Control to Prevention
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to be up to 98% [25–28]. Comparable methods have been used
for MRSP detection in at least two studies [29,30], but currently
no reference standard for the screening of MRSP exists. Many
commercial MRSA selective agars contain cefoxitin as the
selective antimicrobial which might impair the growth of MRSP.
However, the outbreak strain was highly resistant to oxacillin
(MIC .256 mg/ml) and based on our internal evaluation MRSP
isolates with oxacillin MIC $4 mg/ml are detected even if the
bacterial count in the specimen is low. Therefore it is unlikely that
a significant amount of misclassification would have occurred. It
can be considered a limitation that not all patients could be
screened for MRSP upon admission. Consequently, it cannot be
ruled out that some of the patients had MRSP already on
admission. However, in outbreak situations it is not realistic, nor
necessary to screen every patient to determine the admission
status. As discussed above, the likelihood of a community acquired
MRSP ST71 was very low when all evidence was considered.
In this outbreak no common source for MRSP was identified.
Nevertheless, based on the epidemic curve (Figure 2), nosocomial
patient-to-patient transmission was likely. It is widely accepted that
contaminated hands favor the spread of nosocomial pathogens
[31]. In humans the increased use of alcohol based hand rubs has
been associated with a decrease in MRSA incidence in hospitals
[32,33]. Barrier nursing has also been shown effective in reducing
healthcare-associated MRSA infections [34]. Many hospital
pathogens are likely transmitted by fomites, emphasizing the
necessity of a clean environment and clothing [35–37]. However,
the very high number (64 out of 65) of environmental specimens
negative for MRSP suggests that the contaminated hospital
environment was not the reason for maintenance of the outbreak.
The control measures of our outbreak, including cohorting,
patient flow planning, emphasis on hand hygiene, barrier nursing,
prudent antimicrobial use and environmental cleaning are
probably important [31]. Interestingly, Wilson et al. [38] found
that while the use of enhanced cleaning procedures did reduce the
amount of MRSA on hospital surfaces and the hands of healthcare
staff, it did not reduce the number of new patients colonized with
MRSA, although the authors thought that this may have been a
result of a small sample size.
There could be numerous reasons for the long duration of the
outbreak. There is evidence that ST71 is capable of efficient
dissemination [3], perhaps due to multidrug resistance and a
strong ability to form biofilm [19]. While the initial control
measures seemed effective at first, it became clear that more
rigorous efforts were needed. Initially the lack of resources
allocated for infection control was likely to have contributed to
the increased number of cases. New employees not familiar with
the hygiene practices during the summer of 2011, combined with
the lack of personnel due to holidays, may have influenced the
increase in incidence. Also, the absence of effective tracking of
patients exposed to MRSP until a hygiene nurse was appointed in
late 2011 was probably an important factor, since after this the
number of new MRSP cases decreased. The cleaning and
disinfection at the end of 2011 likely favored the cessation of the
outbreak.
In the literature concerning infection control in veterinary
hospitals, the importance to recognize patients colonized with
multidrug resistant organisms has not been properly acknowl-
edged. Failure to recognize patients with multidrug resistant
pathogens – regardless whether infected or colonized – will
eventually lead to dissemination of resistant bacteria in hospitals
and to the community. The search-and-isolate policy implemented
in the Small Animal Hospital is similar to the search-and-destroy
policy that has been used to control MRSA in some countries
[24,39]. It does not, however, include the decolonization of
patients as no research about the efficacy of decolonization
therapy for MRSP has been published. Also, the veterinary use of
some antimicrobials used for decolonization of MRSA in humans,
such as mupirocin, rifampicin or linezolid, is legally prohibited in
Finland. Currently only sporadic cases of MRSP displaying the
outbreak antibiogram are identified, mainly among acknowledged
risk patients, which indicates the success of present policy.
Conclusions
We show that multidrug resistant MRSP is capable of causing a
large hospital outbreak difficult to control. Our findings suggest
that skin lesions of any origin, antimicrobial treatment and
prolonged hospital stay increase the probability of acquiring
MRSP. We demonstrate that rigorous control measures are
needed to control an outbreak and recommend the implementa-
tion of a search-and-isolate policy to reduce the burden of MRSP.
However, standard precautions (hand disinfection, hygienic work
routine, and use of protective clothing in unclean procedures) still
remain the core in preventing the transmission of pathogens
between patients.
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